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SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS: THE EXTENT
OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' PROTECTION
FROM ARBITRARY DISMISSAL
I. INTRODUCTION
One may not have a constitutional right to go to Bagh-
dad, but the Government may not prohibit one from going
there unless by means consonant with due process of law. I
The nature and extent of the substantive due process
rights of public employees are presently very obscure. When
a government employment rule does not touch on an em-
ployee's protected constitutional rights, it is not certain to what
extent the courts are willing to circumscribe the state's tradi-
tional power to compel employee adherence to rules on threat
of dismissal. Despite the absence of independent claims under
the first, fifth, or other amendments, are there circumstances
in which a state's rule will be struck down purely on grounds
of substantive due process because it is arbitrary, irrational,
or unreasonable? For example, could a rule which conditioned
discharges on homosexuality, default on debts, an arrest rec-
ord, public intoxication, or fornication with one's fiance(e) be
successfully attacked? The government wishes to ensure effi-
cient, nondisrupted service to the public, and it needs the
power to dismiss an employee who is lazy, inefficient, insub-
ordinate, or incompetent. The individual employee, on the
other hand, has both a liberty interest 2 and a property inter-
est3 in keeping his or her employment, and an interest in ex-
ercising other rights protected by the Constitution.4
'Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 894
(1961) (quoting Homer v. Richmond, 292 F.2d 719, 722 (D.C. Cir. 1961)) (emphasis
added).
2 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (liberty encompassed an em-
ployee's interest in his good name and integrity and in avoiding the stigma of
discharge with concomitant diminution of future job prospects); Hostrop v. Board
of Junior College Dist. No. 515, 471 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1972) (loss of job deemed
a "liberty" interest).
' Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) ("Once licenses are issued . . . their
continued possession may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension
of issued licenses thus involves state action that adjudicates important interests of
the licensees."); Hostrop v. Board of Junior College Dist. No. 515, 471 F.2d 488
(7th Cir. 1972) (loss of job deemed a "property" interest).
IE.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (freedom of speech);
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (loyalty oath violative of first
amendment rights); Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956)
(freedom against coerced self-incrimination).
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Once a deprivation of a constitutionally protected interest
has been shown, the state's and the employee's interests must
be balanced. 5 The case law evidences a gradual development
of how this balance is to be struck under a diverse set of
factual situations, yet recent pronouncements by the courts
leave the issues unresolved in many important respects. New
and difficult questions have been raised and not yet answered;
judicial analysis has been sparse and unconvincing.
This Comment will attempt to show that, on the basis of
recent Supreme Court and court of appeals precedent, a strong
argument can be made for the existence under the due process
clause of protection from arbitrary government dismissal, in-
dependent of any other right granted by the Constitution.
The Supreme Court opinion in Cleveland Board of Education
v. LaFleur6 hints at the existence of such a right. A recent case
in the Fifth Circuit appears to proceed under the assumption
that it exists.
7
Accepting argueftdo that such substantive due process rights
do exist, there is a pressing need to delineate the contours of
the doctrine. The stakes in the resolution of these issues are
enormous.8 The efficient and vigorous administrator requires
proper judicial buoys to demark a safe course for an agency's
dismissal rules. To maintain effective public service, the agency
must preserve considerable latitude to dismiss incompetent
employees. The public employee needs clear and well-defined
protection against arbitrary dismissal, protection that does not
now exist. He or she needs to be able to identify and challenge
arbitrary dismissal rules.
The balance between the government's interest in effi-
ciency and the public employee's interest in avoiding arbitrary
dismissal must be struck by referring to several factors, includ-
ing the nature of the job, the alleged cause for the discharge,
and the nature of the state's interest in enforcing its rules.
The role of these factors in defining a substantive due process
doctrine of government dismissal is the focus of the Comment's
concluding section.
II. LaFleur: HINTS OF A SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS RIGHT
FORBIDDING ARBITRARY GOVERNMENT DISMISSAL
Thus far, the Court has not had to decide whether the
doctrine of substantive due process has any independent im-
Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895-99
(1961); Lipp v. Board of Educ., 470 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1972).
6 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
7 Thompson v. Gallagher, 489 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1973).
8 There are about 13.1 million public employees in the United States. R. SMITH,
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port in the area of government dismissals. Most government
dismissal cases either have concerned a right guaranteed by
the Constitution outside of the due process clauses 9 or have
emerged from an inadequate procedural setting. 10 Only when
an unmistakable substantive claim of dismissal under an arbi-
trary rule is presented in an adequate procedural setting will
the Court be forced to confront the issue. The markings left
H. EDWARDS, & R. CLARK, LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 5 (1974).
9 See note 4 supra.
10 Unlike its relative, substantive due process, the doctrine of procedural due
process has recently undergone substantial development in dismissal cases. It has
been held that procedural due process must be accorded to a nonprobationary
employee. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564 (1972). Beyond the probationary period the employee acquired a
protected "property" interest in his continued employ. In many cases probation
is a formal stage; where it is not, a de facto "expectation" of continued employment
triggers the due process guarantees. Perry v. Sindermann, supra; Connell v. Higgin-
botham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971). The nature of the process which is procedurally due
a permanent employee upon discharge is not altogether settled. At the least, a hear-
ing procedure must be afforded. Perry v. Sindermann, supra.
Constitutional arguments regarding requirements of specific protections for
employees are often avoided, because a multitude of state and federal statutes and
regulations provide substantial recourse against arbitrary action by government.
Federal law provides for discharge of civil service employees "only for such cause as
will promote the efficiency of the Service," 5 U.S.C. § 7501(a) (1970); agencies prom-
ulgate more particularized regulations regarding suspensions and removals. Exec-
utive Order No. 10987, 3 C.F.R. 519 (1959-1963 Comp.), establishes guidelines for
appeals of administrative decisions; 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970) provides for judicial
review.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970),
was amended in the Equal Employment Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(a)-(b)
(Supp. II, 1972), to extend the jurisdiction of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission to state employees. This confers substantial statutory protection to
employees from arbitrary and discriminatory action based on "race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin .... " 42 U.S.C. § 20O0e-2(a) (1970).
Many states likewise have statutory protection for civil service employees. Ill-
inois, for example, provides both procedural protections of notice of charges and a
hearing, and requires a showing of cause which is detrimental to the service, satis-
fying at least minimal procedural and substantive due process. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
24, § 10-1-18 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973).
Thus, by a patchwork of federal and state provisions, arbitrary dismissal of
government employees has been limited. The need for constitutional adjudication
has been largely obviated. But see Arnett v. Kennedy, 94 S. Ct. 1633 (1974).
In addition to statutory and judicial protection, state employees have been
protected from arbitrary state action by union contracts negotiated with government
employers, e.g., Lipp v. Board of Educ., 470 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1972); Embrey v.
Hampton, 470 F.2d 146 (4th Cir. 1972).
Disclosure of the grounds of discharge, together with an opportunity to rebut
or "challenge their sufficiency" must also be available. Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593 (1973).
Other requirements of procedural due process as it has been defined in the
criminal justice system have not thus far been applied to the public 'employment
field by the Supreme Court. The Court has given some indication that it does not
consider dismissal from government employ to be analogous to defending oneself
in criminal and civil trials. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968).
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by LaFleur suggest that such a claim may be valid under the
Constitution.
In LaFleur the Supreme Court invalidated regulations man-
dating leave without pay for teachers reaching their fifth
month of pregnancy and prohibiting their return to work for
at least three months after childbirth. The Court's opinion
avoided the equal protection arguments which had been urged
upon it by the parties and resolved the question solely on due
process grounds.11 Initially the Court found that the Board's
regulation, by "penaliz[ing] the pregnant teacher for deciding
to bear a child .... can constitute a heavy burden on the exer-
cise of ... protected freedoms." 12 The valid state interests the
Board allegedly furthered by its rule were the assurance of
continuity in the education of its children and the desired
administrative conveniences of ample notice of departure and
of a per se rule rendering individualized hearings unnecessary.
The Court structured its examination in terms of "whether
the interests advanced in support of the rules . . . can justify
the particular procedures [the Board has] adopted" or whether
the rules "needlessly, arbitrarily, or capriciously impinge upon
this vital area of a teacher's constitutional liberty." 13 The pro-
cedures were found to employ an irrebuttable presumption of
incompetency "not necessarily or universally true in fact"; fur-
thermore, the Court found that "the State has reasonable al-
ternative means of making the crucial determination."1 4 The
Court concluded that the due process clause requires "a more
individualized determination.'
15
Without more, this clearly implies that an aggrieved em-
ployee is only entitled to freedom from arbitrary procedures
when a substantive right defined elsewhere in the Constitution
is threatened. However, the Court went well beyond what was
required by the nature of the case as it had just been defined.
"414 U.S. 632, 651 (1974). See id. at 651-52 (Powell, J., concurring in the re-
sult, but adopting an equal protection approach). The parallelism of the due process
and equal protection arguments in such cases is striking. For an interesting con-
trast, compare LaFleur with Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., 473 F.2d 629 (2d Cir.
1973) (equal protection). Identical issues and considerations were raised with sub-
stantially similar resolution in the two cases, but LaFleur was decided on due process
grounds while Green was decided on an equal protection rationale. The Supreme
Court acknowledged the equivalence of the two formulations in some circumstances
in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
12 414 U.S. at 640. The protected freedoms mentioned by the Court included
"freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life," id. at 639, and
the "right 'to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child,'"
id. at 640 (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)).
13!d.
14 Id. at 644-45 (quoting Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973)).
15 Id. at 645.
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It found that the arbitrary departure dates for pregnant teach-
ers had no rational relationship to the state interest of pre-
serving continuity of instruction. 16 The Cleveland return to
work regulation, requiring a three-month wait after childbirth,
was described as "wholly arbitrary and irrational . . .. [It]
serves no legitimate interest, and unnecessarily penalizes the
female teacher for asserting her right to bear children." 17 This
language deals with the substantive rationality of the pregnan-
cy rule itself as an independent matter.
This willingness by the Court to give substantive import to
the due process clause in government dismissal cases is further
signalled by its decision in Arnett v. Kennedy.18 There the
appellee, an employee of the Office of Economic Opportunity,
had been dismissed for claiming that two supervisors had
attempted to bribe other employees with community action
grants in order to obtain statements impugning the appellee
and others. The three judge district court1" held that the Lloyd-
LaFollette Act 20 and its attendant civil service and OEO regu-
lations2 1 "denied appellee due process of law because they
failed to provide for a trial-type hearing before an impartial
agency official prior to removal; the court also held the Act
and implementing regulations unconstitutionally vague be-
cause they failed to furnish sufficiently precise guidelines as
to what kind of speech may be made the basis of removal
action. '22 The Supreme Court reversed, with five Justices
agreeing that no pre-dismissal hearing by an impartial official
was required. Six Justices supported the result on the ground
that the statute was drawn narrowly enough. There was no
majority opinion.
Arnett is interesting in the substantive due process context
because a majority of the Justices rejected the view of Justice
Rehnquist that the "substantive right" of expectancy of contin-
ued employment was conditioned upon the procedural safe-
guards established legislatively to protect those rights.23 A ma-
jority thus agreed that the failure of the Lloyd-LaFollette Act
to provide for a pre-dismissal hearing by an impartial agency
official did not effectively limit any legitimate expectation the
appellee might have had.
16 Id. at 650.
17 Id.
18 94 S. Ct. 1633 (1974).
1" Kennedy v. Sanchez, 349 F. Supp. 863 (N.D. I11. 1972).
20 5 U.S.C. § 7501 (1970).
21 5 C.F.R. §§ 735.201a, 735.209 (1973); 45 C.F.R. §§ 1,015.735-1, 1015.735-24
(1973).
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LaFleur and Arnett indicate that a substantive due process
right forbidding arbitrary dismissal may exist and is likely to
be defined independently of the procedural safeguards that
surround it. Is a regulation that is "wholly arbitrary and irra-
tional," as promulgated or as applied, valid under a substantive
due process test in a case involving no specially protected
interest? In the recent case of Thompson v. Gallagher,2 4 the
Fifth Circuit reached the conclusion that it is not. The appel-
lant, a custodian at a diesel plant, challenged a city regulation
under which he had been dismissed for having received an
undesirable, but not dishonorable, discharge from the United
States Army. The regulation was attacked as violative of the
due process and equal protection clauses. Although finding
no affirmative constitutional right of public employment for
those less than honorably discharged, the court read the four-
teenth amendment as "a general prohibition against arbitrary
and unreasonable government action. 25
Writing for the court, Judge Morgan found that the appel-
lant's right to be sheltered from arbitrary government action
entitled him to reinstatement, despite the absence of a contro-
versy over a constitutionally protected interest independent
of the fourteenth amendment. Although previous public em-
ployee dismissal cases all involved such independent rights,
the court reasoned, "U]ust as a public employee does not give
up his First Amendment rights when he begins receiving a
pay check from the government, neither does he give up his
right to due process of law."'26 On substantive grounds the
court was willing to ask whether the regulation in question
was a "rational means of advancing a valid state interest.
27
The court rejected as invalid on its face any interest the
city had in a per se rule barring employment to veterans,with
undesirable discharges. It demanded to know "what [it is]
about a person with other than an honorable discharge that
makes him unfit to be a city employee. '2 8 An inference by the
city of either criminality or antisocial behavior was found im-
permissible.2 " In the future the city would have to specify
which facets of the military discharge were relevant to the
petitioner's duties as custodian. In addition, in apparent dic-
tum, the panel noted that the city's case would be helped by
a finding of a "comprehensive scheme which enumerated char-
24 489 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1973).
25 Id. at 446.
26 Id. at 447.
2 7 
Id.
28 Id. at 448.
29 Id. at 448, 449.
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acteristics deemed to be conducive to competent performance
as a city employee . ... 30 Noting that other than honorable
discharges may be granted for a wide variety of "antisocial"
characteristics, including "security considerations, sodomy,
homosexuality, financial irresponsibility and bed-wetting," 31
the court found the regulation "too broad to be called 'reason-
able'" and stated that the lack of individualized consideration
made the regulation "irrational. 32
Thompson goes further than LaFleur, then, by subjecting
a dismissal rule to substantive due process analysis for arbitrar-
iness, regardless of the absence of protected rights found else-
where in the Constitution. Under Thompson, a public employee
cannot be dismissed for failure to meet an employment re-
quirement unless the government determines in a procedurally
fair manner both that the employee did in fact fail to meet
the condition and that the condition furthered a legitimate
interest in guaranteeing good service, which would be adverse-
ly affected without it.
Thompson thus sets the stage for judicial articulation of
how the balance of the state interest in efficiency is to be struck
against the need to protect the public employee against bu-
reaucratic whim and arbitrariness. The concluding section of
the Comment will attempt to specify some of the factors that
should be considered in such balancing.
III. BEYOND LaFleur: DEVELOPING A COHERENT SUBSTANTIVE
DUE PROCESS DOCTRINE FOR GOVERNMENT DISMISSALS:
ARBITRARINESS VERSUS EFFICIENCY
If the courts are to define the substantive due process
doctrine more adequately than they have to date, they will
have to make their rules with little guidance from precedent.
It can be asserted with confidence, on the basis of LaFleur
33
and other cases,34 that to pass constitutional muster a discharge
cannot infringe unduly upon the "family interest" or upon
first and fifth amendment rights. Uncertainty easily arises,
however-for example, at what point does criticism of supe-
riors and working conditions step out of protection of the first
amendment and become merely insubordination? Presumably
all grounds for discharge must relate in some fashion to more
effective government services. It is the quantum of substantive




33 See text accompanying notes 11-17 supra.
31 See note 4 supra.
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due process, the degree of relationship required, that is yet
to be developed and explored.
The relevant factors for defining any independent pro-
tection by the due process clause against mere arbitrariness
or capriciousness should include the particular job held, the
ground for discharge, the interests the government declares
impaired by continued employ, and the strength of the infer-
ence of impairment from the cause upon which the discharge
is based.
A. The Job
The particular job the employee holds is an important
variable in assessing the merit of his due process claim. Each
job will have its own set of legitimate, work-related causes for
dismissal. Thus, a regulation of questionable relevance to one
job may be important to another.
What characteristics of different jobs might allow different
regulations? A greater degree of exposure to the public and
greater levels of esteem and investment of public confidence
in a position may sustain a more stringent general "good char-
acter" requirement-a high school principal might constitu-
tionally be subject to dismissal for behavior that is acceptable
from someone such as the school's janitor, whose job has less
visibility. A job conferred on an individual by a state may also
carry with it a sensitivity to public opinion based upon its sym-
bolic status. Teachers and policemen, who fill roles viewed by
the community as models for good behavior, might thus be
subject to greater state-imposed restraints than people whose
jobs are less highly regarded.
The same behavior by public employees with different
jobs might also lead to different constitutional results on the
basis of permissible inferences regarding effects on govern-
ment service. For example, a custodian's or social worker's
inability to handle his or her personal financial affairs properly
might not be grave enough to warrant discharge where no
direct job performance was affected; but the same conduct
by an agent with fiscal responsibility could lead to a su'bstantial
loss of public confidence and to a judicial determination that
a discharge for this reason was constitutional.
B. The Cause of the Discharge
Some grounds for dismissal, such as incompetence or
insubordination, are unquestionably permissible ones. Others,
such as overt racial or sexual discrimination, are equally imper-
missible. Where there is no showing of relation to job perfor-
1654
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mance, discharges made in response to the exercise of a pro-
tected constitutional right are also impermissible. In Pickering
v. Board of Education,35 a teacher spoke out publicly against
the spending practices of the local school board; principles of
freedom of speech were held to protect him against discharge.
Although the Court recognized that the state's interest in reg-
ulating the speech of its employees was greater than its interest
vis-a-vis the general public, it held that the teacher had spoken
out in his capacity as citizen, not in his capacity as employee.
The Court noted that Pickering's statements were not con-
cerned with persons with whom he had daily contact, that no
questions were presented regarding discipline or harmony
among co-workers, and that his employment relationship to
those he criticized did not require loyalty or confidence in
order to function efficiently. 36 Furthermore, the Court found
that Pickering's position did not give him greater ability either
to speak to or to have an impact upon the public. Finally, the
Court found that Pickering's speech could be neither shown
nor presumed "to have in any way either impeded [the] proper
performance of his daily duties in the classroom or to have
interfered with the regular operation of the schools gener-
ally."'37 The implication was that, even in the case of exercise
of freedom of speech, a different result might have obtained
had any of the noted effects been present.
Among the other reasons for dismissal that the courts do
not link to protected interests, such as arrest, indebtedness,
sexual impropriety, and other than honorable discharges, some
seem greater "cause" for dismissal than others. Thus, the more
adverse the impact is upon the performance of the job and
provision of the governmental service, the better the case for
dismissal is. Where the facts show only a marginal impact upon
performance, Pickering may require a court to conclude that
the state's interest in discharge for the particular cause alleged
is arbitrary and violative of substantive due process despite the
absence of a protected interest.
The proper balancing of the interests of the state and -the
employee, even when the impact upon job performance can
be assessed with accuracy, is nonetheless very difficult. Is arrest
or indictment sufficient cause for discharge, or must the state
wait until the employee is convicted? A discharge at the arrest
stage may compromise the presumption of innocence. 38 A con-
35 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
3 6 Id. at 570.
3 7 Id. at 572-73 (footnote omitted).
38 Embrey v. Hampton, 470 F.2d 146, 147 (4th Cir. 1972).
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viction probably permits a stronger inference of unfitness or
bad character. On the other hand, when combined with the
normal criminal penalty a discharge may represent a sanction
more severe than that desired by the legislature when it de-
cided how to punish people who committed specific crimes.
As another example, discrete sexual activities and prefer-
ences are demonstrably less the business of the state than
matters which come to public notice. Purely personal matters
would thus be distinguished from public sexual solicitations
and from indebtedness which becomes part of the public rec-
ord when it is reduced to judgment. Nonetheless, the courts
have not developed coherent principles for determining
which sorts of public and private behavior are sufficient grounds
for discharge and which are not. 9 In any event, the power
of the state, acting as an employer, to intrude into sensitive
personal areas should be narrowly circumscribed.
40
C. The State's Interest
In support of its decision to dismiss an employee, the state
can assert a variety of interests which it hopes to promote and
a -substantial number of adverse effects on the public service
which it hopes to avert. Unless the courts can infer a logical
relation between the rules for dismissal and the performance
of the job by the dismissed employee, these putative state
interests will increasingly be attacked successfully.
Beyond the state's obvious interest in avoiding demon-
strable interference by the employee with satisfactory perfor-
mance of the government's functions, there are three cate-
gories of state interests which have been forwarded in justifi-
cation of employee dismissals. The first concerns the need to
maintain the morale of fellow employees; the second, the need
for low-risk employees of good character; and the third, the
public image of the agency.
19See Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (arrest for homosexual
solicitation insufficient ground for discharge); Carter v. United States, 407 F.2d
1238 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (single overnight stay with female may constitute sufficient
cause for discharge); Taylor v. United States Civil Service Comm'n, 374 F.2d 466
(9th Cir. 1967) (two arrests for "vagrancy-lewd" sufficient grounds for discharge);
White v. Bloomberg, 345 F. Supp. 133 (D. Md. 1972) (single debt insufficient ground
for discharge; privacy argument not reached); Mindel v. United States Civil Service
Comm'n, 312 F. Supp. 485 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (private cohabitation insufficient ground
for discharge).
Drunkenness is another action which could conceivably be grounds for discharge
if it were public, but would not be the state's concern if it were done privately. See,
e.g., Nolting v. Civil Service Comm'n, 7 Ill. App. 2d 147, 129 N.E.2d 236 (1955).
41 Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972);
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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1. Preserving Morale and an Effective Working Atmosphere
As one of its reasons for holding in Pickering v. Board of
Education41 that a teacher's public statement critical of the
school administration did not constitute legitimate grounds
for dismissal, the Supreme Court stated that no adverse effects
had resulted from the statement with regard to the teacher's
performance or his working relations with his colleagues and
superiors. The Court thus implied that the discharge would
have been permissible had these effects been present. What is
left unclear by the Court's opinion is the question whether an
employee can successfully challenge the state's interest in pro-
moting group spirit.
This interest appears most clearly when interaction among
employees is great or when group work is essential. In certain
jobs this is very important. The police, for example, have tra-
ditionally enjoyed a quasi-military aura, and rely heavily on
police force discipline. This is mandated by the nature of their
work and their need for interdependence in difficult-and
often dangerous-situations. An officer who is not trusted by
his fellow officers is in some real sense counterproductive to
the police force.42 When circumstances warrant, the state must
be free to rid itself of persons who are troublesome, captious,
or not trusted by their peers.
Where, however, such interests are less clearly of value to
a job, a court should give less weight to the state's concern. Not
all jobs require the degree of skillful interaction among team
members that the police and fire departments do. The power
to dismiss persons because of failure to "get along" with their
peers is inherently susceptible of abuse, and the criteria of
Pickering should be generally accepted. The state should be
required to show two things that it did not show in Pickering:
that the job requires that the persons involved work well to-
gether with loyalty and mutual confidence, 43 and that as a re-
sult of the proscribed activity relations between those to whom
these bonds were important actually deteriorated. This two-
fold requirement would help protect public employees who
hold unpopular views or behave in an unorthodox fashion
from arbitrary discharge through use of agency regulations.
41 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
42 J. RUBINSTEIN, CITY POLICE (1973). This is also true in fire departments and
hospitals, to name two outstanding examples. It is noteworthy that employees in
all these jobs must function well in emergencies.
43 The ability to work together with loyalty and mutual confidence was found
to be inessential to the satisfactory performance of either the teacher or the members
of the school board in Pickering.
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2. The Need for Low-Risk Employees of Good Character
A second type of state interest urged when a discharge is
challenged is the governmental interest in employing persons
of good character. In Thompson v. Gallagher44 the court strongly
endorsed this interest. Yet it is not at all obvious that a legiti-
mate interest in good character is distinguishable from an il-
legitimate interest in matters which do not concern job per-
formance whatsoever, and which may intrude impermissibly
into matters that should not concern the state.
Its employees' good character, if defined as their honesty
or probity, is of reasonable concern to a state agency. But
whether an employee goes to church, mows his lawn season-
ably, pays child support promptly, or gives to the United Fund
is not a legitimate concern of the state. These aspects of char-
acter are not relevant to employment by the agency. Character
is too general a term. The particular dimensions of character
that may be considered by the state in its decision to discharge
should therefore be narrowly defined within legitimate limits;
failures to meet specific character criteria should be objectively
documented, lest the courts acquiesce in overbroad and un-
checked application of such regulations.
45
In addition, the risk aspect of character is sometimes
raised. It is argued that some employees may be more likely
than others to commit certain offenses that are admittedly
grounds for dismissal. Debt can be said to lead to temptation
to succumb to bribery and other dishonesty; homosexuality
has been considered an Achilles' tendon permitting blackmail,
especially where sensitive materials were considered.
46
This argument is insupportable as grounds for discharge.
It is the quintessence of the "irrebutable presumption" which
is neither "necessarily [n]or universally true. ' 47 Additionally,
like the pregnancy regulation in LaFleur, or the undesirable
discharge provision attacked in Thompson, such a presumption
as grounds for dismissal is grossly overinclusive in its effect
when applied to all employees who fit the rule, and thus
violative of due process. Termination of employment in such
cases is so unrelated to any legitimate state interest in avoiding
dishonesty or disloyalty that it is arbitrary and irrational, and
the state interest of "protection from an increased likelihood
14 489 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1973). See text accompanying notes 24-32 supra.
's Analogous to "character" in its vagueness is "'conduct unbecoming an em-
ployee .... ' Carter v. United States, 407 F.2d 1238, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
"But see Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (homosexuality argu-
ment rejected by the court).
17 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 644 (1974) (quoting Vlandis
v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973)).
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of dishonesty or disloyalty" is as illegitimate as an irrebuttable
presumption.48
A somewhat similar situation exists when efficiency is af-
fected by members of the public or persons involved with an
employee (neighbors, estranged spouses, creditors) who phone
his superiors to complain of his conduct, and thereby disturb
the smooth operation of state offices. Here again, the balance
must be struck delicately-a discharge might promote agency
efficiency but not be directly related to employee conduct.
The employee's control over the situation and an independent
weighing of the privacy aspects of the employee's life against
the antisocial character of the behavior complained of must
be assessed. The court must, however, bear in mind that the
employee is not directly responsible for the reduced efficiency
of the agency. When the employee has no identifiable control
over the complainant or the underlying behavior (or when he
has control and is within his rights to do as he has), a discharge
would be both arbitrary and irrational.
3. The Government's Public Image
A further category of interests advanced to justify dismiss-
als is the potential or actual damage to the agency's public
image that will result from retained employ of the individual.
This is often phrased in terms of embarrassment, putting an
agency in a bad light, or loss of public confidence. In LaFleur,
the state's interest in avoiding the embarrassment of pregnant
teachers in the classroom was not given serious attention by
the Court:
[Evidence below indicates that] the rule had been
adopted in part to save pregnant teachers from em-
barrassment at the hands of giggling schoolchildren
.... [I]t was "not good for the school system" for stu-
dents to view pregnant teachers ....
The school boards have not contended in this
Court that these considerations can serve as a legiti-
mate basis for a rule requiring pregnant women to
leave work; we thus note the comments only to illus-
trate the possible role of outmoded taboos in the adop-
tion of the rules.
49
The attitude of the Court in LaFleur does not give com-
fort to those who would find an "embarrassing" employee
4' This could alternatively be analyzed in terms of an insufficient nexus to the
legitimate interest of avoiding admittedly dishonest or disloyal people.
49 414 U.S. at 641 n.9.
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deserving of discharge. Homosexuals, debtors, or those
brought to court on matters unrelated to job conduct should
be protected when there is no basis for their discharge other
than the undesirable reflection their behavior or status has on
the agency which employs them. Carrying the LaFleur analysis
to these cases, a court would hold that a public agency's image
should reside solely in its efficient, honest, and courteous ser-
vice to the public.
The state unquestionably has legitimate interests at stake
in the calibre of its employees and the quality of the public
service. But substantive due process demands closer scrutiny
of the precise interests allegedly impaired by an employee's
continued employment. The more strongly and directly related
the state's interest is to the performance of the service, the
more legitimate it is. Discharge becomes far less supportable
when the impairment becomes speculative, indirect, or merely
cosmetic.
D. The Nexus
The final consideration in the development of a coherent
substantive due process policy is how closely a given regulation
must relate to an admittedly proper state purpose in order
for discharges made under it to be valid. Two underlying
issues must be resolved before a regulation can be held to be
in compliance with the due process clause: it must not only
be valid on its face, but it also must be valid as applied.
The first of these questions really is whether the regulation
supports an inference that a given characteristic corresponds
in most cases to shortcomings which the state may properly
regard as ground for dismissal. For example, are debtors or
those with other than honorable discharges unsatisfactory
employees often enough to warrant a general conclusion to
that effect and to sustain a regulation requiring such employ-
ees to be dismissed?
Once a court agrees that a given regulation is true in
enough cases to sustain its validity on its face, the second ques-
tion comes into play: which defenses must be available to an
employee to break the presumption in his or her own case?
This due process issue might be characterized as either sub-
stantive or procedural. Until recently, only this second ques-
tion was considered to have any importance.
The recent decisions in Vlandis v. Kline50 and Bell v. Bur-
son 51 focus more attention on the first question, however.
50 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
51 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
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Vlandis states that "permanent irrebutable presumptions have
long been disfavored under the Due Process Clauses .... 52
Similarly, after citing Vlandis and finding the school board's
pregnancy rule wholly arbitrary and irrational, the Court in
LaFleur explained that it did not decide that a different cut-
off date, closer to delivery, would be equally unreasonable,
if buttressed by medical consensus of unfitness or reasonable
and valid administrative concerns. In that event, the state would
not have to provide an opportunity for challenge by individual
employees.
The Court in LaFleur made no distinction between con-
stitutionality "on a rule's face" and "as applied." Yet there is
a difference between these concepts. Using the pregnancy case
as an example, there is some rule, such as the five-month
discharge in LaFleur, which is so arbitrary as to be violative of
substantive due process on its face. Individualized hearings
are irrelevant, for the premise is that five-month pregnant
teachers are, on the average, as fit as any other sample of teach-
ers. At some point in time, however, a presumption or infer-
ence of unfitness may justify a regulation, as long as provision
is made for an individualized hearing into the circumstances
of that case. The courts might find that, as medical consensus
grows, a limited presumption, somewhat comparable to a prob-
able cause for inquiry, is warranted.
Two major questions remain unexplored. The first is the
quantity of consensus necessary to support a rule. Does due
process require that fifty percent of a region's doctors say all
pregnant women are unfit at a certain date, or that seventy-
five percent say sixty-seven percent are?
The second question is the burden of proof at the hearing.
It could be that upon challenge the employee would have to
establish the inapplicability of the rule by reason of his indi-
vidual fitness. Such a presumption of regularity of state action,
with the c(nsequent burden upon the employee, is consonant
with traditional due process analysis. Alternatively, the state
might have to demonstrate its basis for the regulation and give
evidence to sustain its application in a given case. An example
of this latter approach is found in Bell v. Burson.53 The Su-
preme Court there held that the State of Georgia had to make
some preliminary showing of likely fault prior to revocation
of a driver's license under its statute. In Vlandis v. Kline,
54
52 412 U.S. at 446. See also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632,
644-45 (1974); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (presumption that father of
illegitimate children was unfit parent).
53 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
54 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
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on the other hand, Connecticut was required only to furnish
a hearing to permit individuals to plead the affirmative de-
fense that a presumption of out-of-state residency based on
their address at the time of their application to the state uni-
versity was not applicable to them.55 The difference might
depend on a court's intuitive feeling that in one situation the
state is more justified in making its link between cause and
valid purpose than it is in the other.
The state has concerns of considerable moment in wishing
to avoid lengthy hearings and difficult problems of proof. At
a level of "reasonable relation" of a rule to a legitimate state
interest, the rule should survive on its face, and simultane-
ously the burden should shift to the employee to show inappli-
cability, or arbitrariness of application. The "reasonable rela-
tion" should be satisfied at some point more compelling than
,'more likely than not," but could be constitutional at a point
well short of "beyond a reasonable doubt." By eliminating all
causes not reasonably related to valid state purposes, substan-
tive due process would be satisfied. After this, the opportunity
to put in an affirmative defense should be all that is required
to satisfy a test of constitutionality "as applied."
Finally, on the continuum of relation to cause, the nexus
between a stated cause and impaired employee functioning
could grow so strong that a state could constitutionally apply
a presumption irrebuttably. 56 This is what LaFleur seems to
imply in dicta. Examples might include rules that two weeks
before projected delivery, all teachers must stop working; that
a heroin addict may be discharged from the fire department;
that an off-the-job child molester can be dismissed as a teacher;
or that a person suffering a nervous breakdown can be re-
moved from a demanding and delicate job, such as traffic con-
troller at an airport or head of an agency.
IV. CONCLUSION
The lower courts are just beginning to grapple with issues
of dismissal from government jobs. The Pandora's box of sub-
stantive due process is just opening. Many constitutional norms
have changed since Holmes' statement that "[t]he petitioner
may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no
constitutional right to be a policeman.
'5 7
It is essential that substantive due process constraints on
the state as employer be clarified. So doing would give guidance
55 Id. at 452.
56 "Irrebuttably" in this context means that no individualized hearing or affirm-
ative defenses would be allowed.
57 McAuliffe v. Mayor, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892).
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to those who administer government agencies so they can avoid
arbitrariness, and simultaneously render the public adequate
service. The degree to which we are all dependent on efficient
government service and the state's legitimate interest in main-
taining its capability to discharge unsatisfactory employees
must be appreciated, as must the employee's legitimate inter-
ests. This Comment has attempted to identify the emergence
of a substantive due process doctrine in this area and to sug-
gest the factors that should be considered as this largely un-
charted area of the law evolves.
